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ith the five-week closure of the UK Parliament, the highly entertaining sessions of 
the House of Commons have been adjourned. Could this artificial breathing space 
provide a realistic opportunity to deliver the now infamous ‘alternative customs 
arrangements’, making the backstop unnecessary? And without the backstop, could the 
Withdrawal Agreement be ratified soon, opening at long last the way to genuine negotiations 
about the treaty on the future relations between the UK and the EU-27 (based on the Political 
Declaration, a kind of MoU on these negotiations)?  
Why ‘temporary customs arrangements’? 
PM Johnson and his government assert that the border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland should remain as open and (almost) unnoticeable as it is today. On that 
everybody agrees: the return of a traditional, ‘hard’ border would likely inflame extreme 
elements in the region and violence might return after two decades of peace. But the 
temporary backstop incorporated in the Withdrawal Agreement’s Protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland1 is not – according to fanatic Brexiters – the way to organise this. They 
fear that treaty negotiations with the EU – which, nearly three and a half years after the 
referendum, have not yet even begun – might drag on for years and, when stuck, would 
perpetuate the overall ‘backstop regime’ in the Withdrawal Agreement. The overall backstop 
regime consists of far more than a continuation of the EU customs union for Northern Ireland 
 
1 Withdrawal Agreement of 14 Nov 2018, pp. 302 and following https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/ 
draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-
european-atomic-energy-community-agreed-negotiators-level-14-november-2018_en 
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[indeed, for the UK] as shall be illustrated below. The risk of semi-permanence of the overall 
backstop regime would – they hold – frustrate the UK in seizing the ‘great opportunities’ of 
concluding new trade deals and throttle ‘taking back control’. However, first of all their guns 
are aimed at the customs union: can the “single customs territory”2 be avoided by ‘alternative 
customs arrangements’ to keep the border open without visible checks? If accepted by the EU, 
these arrangements would obviate the necessity of the (temporary) customs union as a 
backstop during the negotiations to come.  
This CEPS Policy Insight will deal with two aspects of this conundrum. One is the narrow issue 
of accomplishing ‘frictionless trade’ on the Northern Irish border with Ireland, while fully 
respecting EU rules and controls, yet without being in a customs union with the EU-27. Though 
the ‘alternative customs arrangements’ slogan has been around for more than two years, little 
progress has been made and the European Commission so remains not at all convinced by what 
has been discussed.3 The other aspect is the as yet unratified Withdrawal Agreement, with its 
clear and complete temporary solution: a customs union which is de jure different from the 
present one with the EU-28,4 but de facto the same, with the Union customs code and other 
relevant EU regulations as its basis. Today’s UK government insists it wants to renegotiate some 
crucial parts of the Withdrawal Agreement before proposing ratification by the UK parliament. 
It is worthwhile explaining the Withdrawal Agreement as a whole, much of which is little known. 
For the UK government, however, the core of what would be renegotiated concerns 
‘alternative customs arrangements’.  
What alternative customs arrangements?  
As far as we know there is no fully-fledged UK proposal yet,5 which must mean that the 
discussions with the EU Brexit Task Force are exploratory. Until and unless UK proposals are 
made and found acceptable by the EU for an ‘alternative’ way of organising an open (Northern) 
Irish border, the Withdrawal Agreement with its Protocol stands. However, a confidential 
document from the UK administration of 28 August 2019 – leaked to The Guardian – provides 
a detailed account of the state of preparation of ‘alternative customs arrangements’6 by the 
UK. It confirms that a negotiation position is still being prepared and, indeed, is not even close. 
This shows that Prime Minister Johnson’s repeated statements on ‘proposals’ to the EU are 
incorrect. A number of these ideas have been migrated from previous suggestions in 2017 and 
 
2 Art. 6 of the Protocol. 
3 The present author has twice discussed the customs issues in former UK proposals; see The Brexit Customs vision 
– frictions and fictions, CEPS Commentary of 22 August 2017; and Shattered illusions: the new Brexit proposals on 
customs, 17 July 2018 https://www.ceps.eu/publications/shattered-illusions-new-brexit-proposals-customs  
4 Different because it is formally concluded between the UK customs territory (after withdrawal from the EU) and 
the customs union of the EU27.  
5 Apparently, according to the Mail on Sunday of 15 September, there is a plan drafted by Chief Brexit negotiator 
David Frost. The following shows that the details of such a ‘plan’ are nowhere near completion.  
6 ‘The aim … is to ultimately establish an alternative arrangements negotiation position as part of the renegotiation 
of the Withdrawal Agreement. [..] … the top HMG priority’. (p.2) 
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2018,7 such as that of the trusted trader (or AEOs) – an existing scheme in the EU, which might 
be extended, under conditions – and IT-facilitated roll-on-roll-off of trucks (where more details 
on the IT aspects and secured seals of containers are provided). In total, some 16 ‘facilitations’ 
are specified in their Annex 1. Of course, facilitations lower the costs for officials and business 
but are, by definition, insufficient to allow an open frontier. The technology-based options 
overlap to a considerable extent with each other which renders comprehensive understanding 
difficult.8 No wonder the paper says that “[T]he complexity of combining them into something 
more systematic and as part of one package is a key missing factor at present”(p.4).  
Alternative regulatory options 
However, the paper also suggests four regulatory options. Since they are ‘alternative’, they 
differ from the regulatory solutions in the Protocol, be it in different degrees. One is the ‘border 
code’, a common set of rules and industry procedures that apply to all parties who have a 
contractual right of access to the border.9 There is no elaboration in the paper about the 
treatment of those not having a ‘contractual right of access’. How the border code differs from 
e.g. the ‘trusted trader’ is also unclear. Another is the intricate proposal by Declan Billington,10 
focused largely on animal products and SPS issues (where physical inspection is mandatory in 
the EU). Although his premise is not to have a single customs territory with the EU, unlike the 
Protocol, he opts for (i) UK-wide alignment and dynamic harmonisation with EU SPS legislation 
and tariff codes for products of animal origin, (ii) for all other products, Northern Ireland 
alignment with the EU Customs Code and relevant regulation 11, yet (iii) no single customs 
territory because the UK sets its own tariffs12 and (iv) competent Northern Ireland authorities 
undertake ‘in-market SPS checks’. Items (i) and (ii) are no different from the Protocol or indeed 
(for all practical purposes) EU membership. Item (iii) might express a desire to have much lower 
agri-tariffs (and possibly tariff quotas that are larger) than the EU but it should probably be read 
as implying a zero-tariff zone between the EU27 and the UK. This raises the query whether such 
a set-up can be organised in the short run, under a revised Withdrawal Agreement, as it signifies 
a non-trivial departure from the Protocol (with a fully-fledged customs union).  
Two other regulatory options are – presumably – controversial. One consists of a common SPS 
zone between Northern Ireland and Ireland, based on EU SPS regulation. Which, of course, 
 
7 See footnote 3 
8 A number of the ideas rely on IT, data and technologies which partially overlap. For instance, the option of ‘AI 
and machine learning’ (to better target inspections, a form of smart risking), automatic number plate reading, 
Internet-of-things programmed to support real-time analysis of consignments and the option of ‘smart risking’ 
clearly overlap ; in addition, three other options might well overlap with these as well : secure supply chain visibility 
(added is a mobile application to facilitate RoRo traffic), secure technologies (on smart locks and basic seals) and 
vehicle telemetry (on-board of a truck).  
9 There is no further explanation. The border is ‘owned and operated by Border Force’. Access to the border 
suggests a physical border, or equivalent, the one thing everybody wants to avoid.  
10 CEO of Northern Ireland Food & Drink Association and member of the AA group of the UK governement. 
11 Annex 5 legislation as in the Protocol, i.e. on EU technical regulation and conformity assessment. 
12 Except for products of animal origin. 
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exists today. However, the UK (without Northern Ireland) would be able to diverge. It is 
recognised that this would require customs declarations and intense checks on SPS goods 
(between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK), the inevitable price to pay. The other 
proposal is pretty amazing: Irish alignment with the UK on SPS issues.13 How Ireland and the EU 
at large could ever accept this, as it would not be identical to EU law one suspects, is not even 
touched upon. Unless it all remains harmonised with the EU, in which case it is pointless and it 
would be better to follow the Protocol.  
An ingenious new proposal 
Altogether, there seems to be no silver bullet yet14 and 31 October 2019 is only weeks away. 
Ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, including the Protocol, is also not in sight. However, 
somewhat unexpectedly, a radically different proposal for ‘alternative customs arrangements’ 
has emerged from three prominent lawyers. Faull, Weiler & Sarmiento15 hold that a new 
regime of ‘dual autonomy’ would be the way to solve this border conundrum and fend off a 
costly no-deal. They claim that no joint customs territory would be required and that the new 
regulatory autonomy of the UK, post-Brexit, would be upheld. In other words, it would address 
the two objections of the Brexiters about the temporary backstop, and – in doing so – any time-
limit of the backstop would become irrelevant as well. Although this already sounds too good 
to be true, the authors also claim that their proposal delivers ‘symmetry’ between the EU27 
and the UK in terms of respect for one another’s laws. The authors start from the premise that 
46 years of UK’s EU membership have created a profound foundation of trust. Given that the 
current backstop essentially maintains EU law for goods in the UK and incorporates a strict 
system of implementation, application and enforcement (with EU officials joining controls on a 
random basis), the EU would rely heavily on the UK regime and authorities to uphold EU law 
under the backstop (if it were ratified). There is nothing strange about this for EU member 
states, but in this case it would mean a similar arrangement with a third country, be it a former 
member state with decades of EU experience. The point that the EU under the backstop relies 
on UK law and strict enforcement, is critical for their reasoning. In their own proposal the EU 
would do the same. 
Faull et al. propose that knowingly exporting goods that do not comply with EU rules and 
standards through the frontier from Northern Ireland to the Republic would be a violation of 
UK (!) law, besides, of course, a violation of EU law, and – mutatis mutandis – it will be a 
 
13 Indeed, ‘creating a new common rulebook shared across the British Isles’. However, the island of Northern 
Ireland and Ireland is a single epidemiological area under EU law, not the British Isles together.  
14 Even when a silver bullet in these ‘alternative arrangements’ would be found, the various technological 
approaches would have to be agreed and carefully tested to the satisfaction of both Parties. Such processes are 
bound to take time and cannot be politicised. Therefore, either the Protocol begins to work as envisaged in the 
present text, and might later possibly be amended with ‘alternative’ options, whilst the treaty negotiations would 
be conducted. Or, stubborn insistence on (as yet immature) ‘alternative arrangements’ would lead to the awkward 
choice between cancelling Brexit (by withdrawing the Art 50 letter) or a no-deal crashing out.  
15 In: An offer the EU and UK cannot refuse, a proposal on how to avoid a no-deal Brexit, Verfassungsblog,22 
August 2019, see https://verfassungsblog.de/an-offer-the-eu--and-uk-cannot-refuse  
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violation of Irish (!) law for exports of goods in the other direction when not compliant with UK 
law. Severe penalties, possibly criminal liability, are implied. The authors do count on some of 
the facilitations16 discussed earlier, which amount to the avoidance of a visible border while 
also maintaining random spot checks. EU officials would be able to participate in random spot 
checks under the backstop and they could do the same in their proposal. Could a truck with 
non-compliant goods drive through the border? The authors are confident that the proposed 
regime, if properly enforced as foreseen, would not be less compliant. After all, both Ireland 
and the UK have to enforce. The Protocol would be replaced by a new agreement incorporating 
the above elements, with the relevant changes in UK and Irish law as a corollary. They also 
propose a few variants of how to arrive at a legally binding commitment, either at the European 
Council or via amendment of the Withdrawal Agreement.  
Surely, the proposal is unique and original. But is it effective and does it not have significant 
drawbacks? Its effectiveness is asserted but in fact would require extensive facilities with 
detailed automated IT procedures, and these have to be agreed and tested, which takes time. 
It is true that this can be a variant of the ‘trusted traders’ set-up but whether all SMEs in the 
region would be able to do this on relatively short notice, and at low cost, is not at all sure.17 
And the proposed EU Trade or Standards Centres would have to be organised and/or built 
quickly. Another objection, from comments online, consists of the lack of direct interest in 
strictly enforcing the laws of the other Party.18 A third drawback is the diminished reputation 
of UK customs in ‘Brussels’ after two major failures to act harshly and swiftly on major frauds.19 
This point is sometimes combined with the fact that a leaving country is not the same as a 
member state, as well as with the observation that some fanatical Brexiters openly tout with 
non-compliance.  
Joseph Weiler has responded (alone) to the ‘we cannot trust the Brits’ excuse,20 for which he 
finds no rational grounds (thereby ignoring some recent evidence), pointing out (correctly) that 
in terms of enforcement (etc.) the ‘outsourcing’ to the Brits also occurs under the backstop and 
is actually less in their proposal (as in their proposal UK law itself is at stake). Weiler notes that 
if the excuse were correct, the backstop is also doomed to fail. Legalistically, one can agree but 
in terms of incentives – a fully-fledged customs union based on EU law and the regulatory 
aspects of the Withdrawal Agreement (see below) – this risk seems far smaller. Faull, Weiler & 
 
16 Such as what they call EU Trade Centres and EU Standards Centres for certification of compliance before the 
actual shipping of the goods across the border or even the payment of any duties. ‘Once cleared and certified, the 
need for processing at the frontiers is obviated and the Irish border can remain open as it is today’ (p.3).  
17 Precisely this fear is also a problem underlined by the leaked AA taskforce paper of the UK government. 
18 Actually, one can go further, there will also be a complication. Remember the original 2004 proposal of the 
Services directive by the Commission (esp. Bolkestein) with the country-of-origin-principle. The upshot would have 
been that judges in member state A would have to pass rulings on the basis of laws in member state B or C. Many 
lawyers, understandably, felt rather uncomfortable with such a set-up. That the CJEU would eventually perhaps 
settle a difference of interpretation, helps, but cannot be expected for each and every case.  
19 One of these was about no less than € 2.7 bn fraud by Chinese companies.  
20 See https://verfassungsblog.de/backstop-alternatives-examining-the-we-cannot-trust-the-brits-excuse  
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Sarmiento in their proposal hold that two legal orders interact but preserve their autonomy, 
with a premise of ‘mutual trust and sincere cooperation’. However, such a presentation is a 
little removed from the reality on the ground. Take the long experience of ‘mutual recognition’ 
in the EU. Outside the food and drink sector, where it helped transform food regulation, this 
great principle did not work in actual practice for several decades21 and business in Europe 
became disillusioned. The mutual trust and sincere cooperation between the member states, 
with strong encouragement by the EU’s highest judges plus guidelines from the Commission, 
was largely lacking. Mutual recognition turned out to be more like a ‘phantom in the 
courtroom’. It took a procedural EU regulation22 in 2008 for the situation to improve. Even so, 
an independent evaluation in 201523 found a series of lingering barriers, due in part to lack of 
mutual trust between member states and to less-than-sincere cooperation when companies, 
having products already lawfully produced and marketed in another member state, failed to 
convince authorities in some other EU countries; also the dialogue between member states’ 
authorities was found to be slow and incomplete on many occasions. The upshot was a new, 
stricter mutual recognition regulation in 2019.24 By analogy, the acceptance by the EU, Ireland 
and the UK – and all three are required – of such a ‘dual autonomy’ approach cannot therefore 
be taken for granted.  
Moreover, there might be legal objections, even if trust were openly expressed at the highest 
level and sincere cooperation is intended.25 One legal objection is about ‘trust’ itself. The CJEU 
has recently ruled26 that the principle of ‘mutual trust’ in the case of enforcement can only 
apply between EU member states, which implies that – after Brexit – it cannot apply to the UK. 
In other words, the Faull et al. option might well end up in Luxembourg and, despite the good 
intentions, might be ruled out by the CJEU. Another legal objection might emerge from how 
the Faull et al. option would be turned into law. It would be indispensable for the Withdrawal 
Agreement to be amended first, and ratified, because an Ireland/UK agreement itself cannot 
change the Withdrawal Agreement. But it also matters for EU law: the CJEU would never accept 
that the enforcement of EU law was regulated in an UK/Ireland agreement.  
However, there are other arguments that may help to assess the Faull et al. approach. Their 
basis is straightforward, yet not explicitly mentioned, let alone emphasised. Rather than, as the 
three authors do, starting from trust and sincere cooperation as the foundation (although 
clearly one needs some of this), the backstop or its alternative starts with perfectly identical 
laws on both sides. Most of these EU laws have been around for a while and have gone through 
 
21 For extensive analysis, see J. Pelkmans, Mutual recognition in goods, on promises and disillusions, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 14/5, August 2007. 
22 Reg, 764/2008, OJEU L 218 of 13 August 2008, pp. 21 -29.  
23 Technopolis, EY, VVA & Danish Tech Institute (2015), Evaluation of the application of the mutual recognition 
principle in the field of goods, June, for the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-
market/goods/free-movement-sectors/mutual-recognition/index_en.htm  
24 Reg. 2019/515 in OJEU L 91 of 29 March 2019.  
25 The following was brought to my attention by my colleague Guillaume van der Loo and I am indebted to him 
and my colleague Steven Blockmans.  
26 In the Achmea case  
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many revisions. In other words, there are no obvious reasons for immediate changes in the 
short or even medium run. A lot of EU technical regulation is moreover linked to European 
harmonised standards and the UK has been very clear that it desires to remain a part of this 
system (and BSI of CEN/CENELEC). In the Withdrawal Agreement (see below), there are also 
provisions on maintaining a level playing field in six areas of EU goods regulation between the 
EU27 and the UK. Even if the Faull et al. approach needed to be applied for as long as four or 
five years, how much of a problem would there be in that period? Very little indeed. The formal 
‘regulatory autonomy’ for goods of the two legal systems – supposedly an advantage in this 
approach – does not amount to much in the period foreseen. That also goes for the objections 
to their approach: trading over the Northern Irish frontier without clearing certificates, etc., 
must have a reason and with identical laws, there is no new reason to do so. One should also 
not forget that UK business is adamant about the ‘common rule book’ because trade with the 
EU and especially value-chains are so important for them. If and only if negotiations on a new 
treaty became stuck for many years (despite all the powerful incentives to overcome that, 
which would be most unlikely) would that approach possibly have distinct benefits. In that case, 
its credibility critically depends on permanent and tight enforcement and full acceptance of the 
CJEU in difficult cases.  
In all this, it is assumed that no tariffs would be levied between the EU27 and the UK. Faull et 
al. discern no difference if there would be tariffs, as they hold that tariffs can be handled in EU 
Trade Centres just as well. Yes, in principle. But the incentives for smuggling are obviously 
greater, which must mean that the enforcement regime has to be harsher too. In fact, much of 
the enforcement will have to be a ‘dual enforcement’ (by Ireland and the UK) in order to protect 
a ‘dual autonomy’.  
A ‘regulatory union’ for goods in the Withdrawal Agreement 
Beyond the ‘alternative customs arrangements’ which would ‘liberate’ the UK from the 
constraints of the EU commercial policy and enable an ‘independent’ UK trade policy with ‘great 
opportunities’, there is the wider question of the Withdrawal Agreement. In the 10 months 
since the conclusion of the Withdrawal Agreement, there has been little if any discussion on its 
substance. However, its substance is very interesting and goes much beyond the three core 
issues for an orderly withdrawal. Those three issues are: citizen rights, separation provisions 
and financial provisions.27 However, the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland – functioning as 
a ‘backstop’– that follows after these typical ‘withdrawal issues’ is completely different. In 
tumultuous debates on Brexit, the Protocol is often regarded as a constraint on future UK trade 
policy. Nevertheless, closer study shows that its nature is much more regulatory than a typical 
customs union chapter, be it regulatory solely on goods. The 18 pages of the Protocol itself are 
followed by 10 annexes (a total of 155 pages), the bulk of which is on regulatory obligations. 
Annex 5 on technical regulation and conformity assessment (etc.) essentially prevents the UK 
 
27 Other ‘Parts’ include the Pre-amble, Common provisions, Transition and Institutional and Final provisions (incl. 
dispute settlement).  
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from taking ‘back control’ (if it wanted to) in this massive domain of goods regulation, for the 
purpose of the Protocol and for the period of its validity. This Annex lists 290 EU technical 
directives and regulations. In addition, Annex 6 on VAT & excise lists another 21 EU laws, Annex 
7 on electricity another 7 and Annex 8 on state aid another 51 (plus the relevant articles of the 
treaty specified). Even more interesting is Annex 4 linked to Art. 6(2) of the Protocol on a ‘level 
playing field’ (LPF), on which the EU27 is very keen.28 Annex 4 has specifications on taxation, 
environmental protection, labour and social standards, state aid, competition and state-owned 
enterprises. The LPF provisions are unique and might be interpreted as a basic pre-condition 
for the negotiations of a later treaty on the (economic) relations between the EU27 and the 
UK. Annex 4 may well foreshadow the details and complications of such an LPF regime29 if the 
new treaty is going to be ‘deep and comprehensive’.  
The interesting question is whether this ‘regulatory’ part of the Protocol would remain in place 
even when ‘alternative customs arrangements’ would somehow be agreed by the EU and the 
UK. This is not impossible because a common rulebook for goods was proposed in the 2018 
Chequers proposal of the May government. The UK proviso that the common rulebook would 
only go so far as would be necessary for frontier controls has meanwhile been addressed with 
an agreement on LPF in Annex 4 of the Protocol, hence the EU would wish to migrate these 
provisions to the future EU27/UK treaty.  
Conclusions 
The current rather reckless brinkmanship of the UK government would seem to be based on 
attitudinal or emotional politics, rather than on a workable and technically sound plan for 
‘alternative customs arrangements’. A one-month breathing space is unlikely to be sufficient to 
forge a coherent, technically sound and watertight package in a proposal to the EU27. Not to 
speak of technical testing by both parties and eventual acceptance in a redraft of the Protocol 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland of the Withdrawal Agreement by the EU legislator. Given that most 
of the technical suggestions have been around for a while without a full solution emerging, or 
do not get beyond mere ‘facilitation’ (i.e. lowering costs), the 31 October 2019 deadline cannot 
possibly have a useful function in this respect. Even an extension of the Brexit deadline to late 
January 2020 is not useful, if its purpose were to acquire full confidence in ‘alternative customs 
arrangements’ with all their technicalities. That would take more time even with the most 
cooperative spirit.  
A new approach as proposed by Faull, Weiler & Sermiento might perhaps be a way out but in 
any event not on such short notice. Their basic idea is disarmingly simple. Their ‘dual autonomy’ 
 
28 It is asserted that Barnier once said that ‘hell would break loose’ among EU voters and in business circles if the 
UK after Brexit attempted to engage in weakening regulatory objectives with a view to gain competitiveness 
artificially.  
29 See the detailed and careful analysis of the LPF issues and specifications in the Protocol in a new book published 
by EPC and co-authored by David Baldock, Larissa Brunner, Pablo Ibanez Colombo, Emily Lydgate, Marley Morris, 
Martin Nesbit, Jacques Pelkmans, Vincent Verouden and Fabian Zuleeg: Ensuring a post-Brexit level playing field, 
May 2019, www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_9223_brexit_lpf?doc_id=2171  
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proposal seems attractive for Brexiters as it responds to the symbolism of UK autonomy and 
symmetry and would not require a great deal of legal change. It would require an amendment 
of the Protocol and changes about enforcement and penalties (and possibly criminal liability) 
in UK and Irish law, following from that. Presumably, random spot checks might have to be 
done by Ireland and the UK together. In addition, it would also require some of the 
technological ‘arrangements’ (with the investment and testing needed) which implies that it 
cannot be delivered and operational in less than a year, if not longer. The drawbacks discussed 
above appear problematic on first sight but might well be trivial in the short-to-medium run as 
the relevant technical and SPS regulation on both sides is well tested and identical on both sides 
to begin with. Only if the later UK/EU treaty negotiations would become stuck for a long time, 
despite the powerful economic incentives to agree, the ‘mutual trust and sincere cooperation’ 
underlying the Faull et al. proposal would be severely tested. This is not the right place and 
moment to speculate on the negotiations to come but it is worth noting that neither the 
Political Declaration nor the one-liner in the Withdrawal Agreement are easy to interpret in 
terms of feasibility.30 Faull et al. suggest that their option might also be useful for the later trade 
relationship and this, in turn, might tally with articles 19 and 27 of the Political Declaration 
where ‘alternative arrangements’ are advocated for ensuring the permanent absence of a hard 
border on the island of Ireland. For a permanent solution, the burden of very strict enforcement 
by the two countries together – also in order to protect the integrity of the EU’s single market 
– the Faull et al. proposal would seem to be less adequate, if not unsuitable, and perhaps even 
illegal as it would no longer be part of the Withdrawal Agreement. Regulatory convergence 
might weaken over time, in sharp contrast to the temporary arrangement. It remains to be seen 
whether the UK, Ireland and the EU would be willing – and indeed legally capable - to switch to 
the ‘dual autonomy’ approach - apparently, inside the Commission there are strong 
hesitations.31  
The Withdrawal Agreement’s Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, however, is mostly about 
common regulation for goods trade rather than customs. In addition, it comprises a fairly 
detailed set of provisions on a level playing field in six areas of regulatory policies. All of this for 
the period of future negotiations and possibly beyond this for the future trade agreement. The 
Agreement would therefore greatly facilitate value-chain based trade in goods. Combined with 
the possible solution of the customs approach, the enormous fuss about a ‘new deal’ is difficult 
to comprehend. Unless the anxiety emerges from the inference that there is only “just a little 
Brexit” in goods markets.  
 
3030 Art. 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement is rather cautious : “The Union and the United Kingdom shall use their 
best endeavours, in good faith and in full respect of their respective legal orders, to take the necessary steps to 
negotiate expeditiously the agreements governing their future relationship referred to in the political declaration 
[…] and to conduct the relevant procedures for the ratification or conclusion of those agreements, with a view to 
ensuring that those agreements apply, to the extent possible, as from the end of the transition period”. The 
Political Declaration seeks a switch from the erstwhile joint customs union to a permanent free trade area, 
combining deep regulatory and customs cooperation and a level playing field (art. 22) with a single customs 
territory (art 23), a unique combination 
31 See als Weiler’s note of 30 August 2019 (cf. footnote 18, above) 
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 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
